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I. Introduction 
This paper reports on laboratory experimental 
research designed to study the behavioral prop- 
erties of two different market environments gov- 
erned by cycling excess demand: (1) a market in 
which successive market periods are temporally 
isolated (autarky), and (2) a market in which 
agents (speculators) are allowed to carry com- 
modity units from one period to another, thus 
temporally linking the cyclical phases of the mar- 
ket. We analyze observations from a total of 18 
markets, all organized under double auction trad- 
ing rules. The markets employ the PLATO com- 
puter network as the medium of public informa- 
tion transfer and private information display. 
Our research builds on the previous experi- 
mental findings of Miller, Plott, and Smith (1977) 
(hereinafter MPS) and Williams (1979). These 
studies employed a common design where a se- 
quence of "trading years" governed by stable 
supply are divided into a blue (low-demand) sea- 
son and a yellow (high-demand) season. The sup- 
ply and demand arrays were cyclically stable and 
resulted in a unique intertemporal competitive 
equilibrium. The experiments employed six 
This study reports the 
results of 18 com- 
puterized "double-auc- 
tion" market experi- 
ments characterized by 
cycling excess demand. 
Two such market de- 
signs are studied: one 
with stationary supply 
and cycling demand, 
the other with cycling 
supply and demand. 
Data from a series of 
control experiments 
under conditions of in- 
tertemporal isolation 
(autarky) are compared 
with data from experi- 
ments where the two 
cyclical market phases 
are linked by a subset 
of agents (speculators). 
Allowing intertemporal 
speculation is found to 
be a significant treat- 
ment variable in both 
market designs; how- 
ever, price conver- 
gence patterns are not 
robust with respect to 
the design change. 
* We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the Na- 
tional Science Foundation and research assistance from Don 
Coursey, who aided us in conducting many of the experiments 
reported in this study. 
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buyers, six sellers, and two agents called "traders" who, in equilib- 
rium, carry four commodity units over from the blue to the yellow 
season in each trading year. Traders are restricted to buying in the blue 
season and selling in the yellow season and are not allowed to carry 
units over beyond a yellow season. 
The MPS (1977) study initially demonstrated that, after several trad- 
ing years, such markets generated contract prices near the intertem- 
poral competitive equilibrium and significantly different from the 
seasonal competitive prices predicted under conditions from intertem- 
poral autarky. Williams (1979) extended these results by replicating 
MPS's speculation experiment and comparing the results with actual 
contract prices from an autarky experiment using the same market 
design but without traders. The results of this potentially much more 
rigorous test of the ability of a class of speculators to reduce seasonal 
price fluctuations indicated that the existence of such agents was in- 
deed a highly significant experimental treatment variable. 
' 
After we describe the trading mechanism in Section II and our ex- 
perimental subjects in Section III, Section IV reports the results of two 
speculation experiments and two autarky experiments that replicate 
the basic design used by Williams (1979) in his autarky-speculation 
comparison. We then report, in Section V, the results of 10 speculation 
experiments and four autarky experiments using an entirely new cycl- 
ical market design. This new design has a socially optimal intertem- 
poral carry-over of nine units and is characterized by cycling demand 
and supply. In our PLATO computerized double-auction mechanism 
traders operate in a less restricted environment than in the previously 
cited laboratory markets. Most important, we are able to drop the 
explicit blue/yellow seasonal distinction entirely and allow traders to 
switch between buying mode and selling mode at will within or be- 
tween trading periods. In addition, we explicitly introduce commodity 
perishability and scrap-value parameters. 
While the previous experimental work with intertemporally linked 
double auctions clearly demonstrates that knowledge of the underlying 
market structure is unnecessary for the attainment of an observed 
behavioral equilibrium that is near the theoretical intertemporal com- 
1. Hoffman and Plott (1981) have extended the MPS and Williams studies by compar- 
ing speculation experiments conducted under double-auction trading rules with similar 
experiments conducted under posted-offer trading rules. They conclude that contract 
prices tend to be higher under posted-offer rules and convergence toward the intertem- 
poral competitive price slower than in double auctions. The result that, compared with 
the double auction, posted-offer pricing works to the disadvantage of the "silent side' of 
the market (buyers) is consistent with experimental evidence using stable supply and 
demand configurations without speculators reported by Ketcham, Smith, and Williams 
(1983). Plott and Uhl (1981) have also studied the behavior of a class of middlemen in a 
competitive market where direct exchange between buyers and sellers was not permit- 
ted. 
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petitive equilibrium, these studies provide important imformation to 
the participants concerning the cyclical nature of the market. In addi- 
tion to dividing the market years explicitly into blue and yellow sea- 
sons, the buyers' (sellers') record sheets revealed their individual in- 
duced valuation (cost) structure for the entire experiment. In the 
experiments reported below, participants do not have "perfect 
foresight" into the future value or cost of their commodity units. Indi- 
vidual valuation and cost parameters are revealed privately by PLATO 
before the beginning of each period for that period only. Furthermore, 
participants do not know how many buyers, sellers, and traders are in 
the experiment, although they do know the total number of market 
participants. A priori, we were uncertain how these reductions in the 
subjects' information sets would affect market performance. Will 
speculators fail to perceive the profit opportunities inherent in the cy- 
clical market? Even if speculators recognize the existence of potential 
opportunities for profit, will they choose to act on this in the presence 
of substantial perceived risk associated with inventory accumulation? 
Will intertemporal carry-over fall short of the socially optimal level? 
Given these possibilities, will markets with speculators behave differ- 
ently from markets without speculators? 
II. The PLATO Double-Auction Exchange Mechanism with Traders 
Basic Trading Mechanics 
The trading procedure employed in this study is a revised version of 
the PLATO computerized transformation of the oral double auction de- 
scribed in detail by Williams (1980). Buyers (sellers) are free at any 
time to enter a bid to buy (offer to sell) one unit of an undefined 
homogeneous commodity by typing their entry and then touching a 
rectangular area on their display screen (see fig. 1) labeled "ENTER 
BID" ("ENTER OFFER") at which time the entry is made public 
unless it violates some institutional rule. Any buyer (seller) is free to 
accept any seller's offer (buyer's bid) by touching a display screen area 
labeled "ACCEPT OFFER" ("ACCEPT BID"). The acceptor must 
then touch an area labeled "CONFIRM CONTRACT," at which time 
a binding contract is formed and the information is logged in both the 
maker's and taker's private record sheets. Bids, offers, and subsequent 
contracts are the only public information. The incorporation of PLATO'S 
touch sensitive display screen into the double-auction software is not 
just an exercise in computer showmanship. The utilization of touch 
input serves to reduce the complexity of the task market participants 
confront. They are able to prepare a price quote for entry into the 
market and then to focus all their attention on the market information 
continually being presented on their display screen. 
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TRFADING PERIOD (columns) 
RECORD SHEET for TRADER 1 1 2 3 4 5 
Unit 1 selling price 5.05 6.64 5.05 6. 70 
Unit 1 purchase price 5.00 6.61 5.00 5. 10 
Profit 0.05 0.03 0.05 1.60 
Unit 2 selling price 6.66 66 
Unit 2 purchase price 6.56 6 
Profit 0.1 o 
Unit 3 5elling price 
Unit 3 purchase price 
Profit 
Unit 4 5elling price 
Unit 4 purchase price 
Profit 
Unit 5 5elling price ____ ___ 
Unit 5 purchase price 
Profitc 
Tota l Pro f i t (over a 1 1 un its) I0. 05 10. 03 0. 0z5 1. 70 
Current inventory=5, unit life=3, unit scrap value=$4.00 
Period purchased | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 l 
Purchase rice 1 5.10i 5.11 15.15 15.10 15.15 
Working capital=$11.83 inventory cost-scrap value=$ 5.61 
A BUYER BIDS $5.08 A SELLER OFFERS $5.15 
| ENTER | >$ flACCEPT CONFIRM 
OFFER ol BIDD CONTRACT 
-Data-5sw itch 
Contract5:5.25,5.20,5.10,5.15,5.20,5.10,5.11,5.15,5.10,5.15 
Trading Period 5 now in progress. SECONDS REMAINING: 62 
9 of 10 people have voted to end period 5: Press -LAB- to vote 
FIG. 1.-Basic screen display for a trader 
Price quotes must progress so as to reduce the bid-ask spread. Only 
the highest bid to buy and the lowest offer to sell are displayed to the 
entire market and are open to acceptance. Any quotation that does not 
provide better terms to the other side of the market is placed in a queue 
that ranks bids from highest to lowest (offers from lowest to highest). 
After a contract occurs the highest queued bid and the lowest queued 
offer are automatically entered as the new bid-ask spread. The maker 
of a queued price quote is given continuously updated information on 
the quote's position in the queue. Queued entries may be withdrawn at 
any time by pressing a key labeled -EDIT-.2 
Trading occurs over a maximum of 15 market periods each lasting a 
prespecified number of seconds (either 300 or 330 in the experiments 
reported below.) The market participants can bypass this stopping rule 
by unanimously voting to end a period. Registering a vote to end a 
trading period does not affect the individual's ability to participate 
2. Smith and Williams (1983b) found that this variation of the basic PLATO double- 
auction mechanism, which incorporates an electronic limit order file or "specialist's 
book" (the bid and offer queues) with the bid-ask spread reduction rule, tends to outper- 
form several other computerized double auctions in price stability and the rapidity of 
convergence to the competitive equilibrium. 
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actively in the market. The number of seconds remaining and the cur- 
rent vote to end the period are presented as shown at the bottom of 
figure 1 and are updated about every 1 or 2 seconds. 
Speculation Mechanics3 
Market participants designated as traders have the unique ability to 
switch from buying mode to selling mode at any time by pressing a key 
labeled -DATA-. Traders are given a capital endowment to cover their 
initial inventory investment and can add to (subtract from) this amount 
over the course of the experiment by accumulating profits (incurring 
losses) from buying and then reselling commodity units for their own 
accounts.4 Traders are paid in cash the amount of their final working 
capital defined as the capital endowment plus any accumulated profits 
or losses. The perishability of the commodity units is given by a pre- 
initialized "unit life," which determines the maximum number of pe- 
riods that an inventory unit can be carried before it "expires." For 
example, if the unit life is set to three, as in the design II experiments 
reported below, a unit purchased during trading period 1 would expire 
at the end of trading period 4. Any inventory unit that expires is auto- 
matically sold at a pre-initialized scrap value and the resulting loss is 
subtracted from the trader's working capital. The scrap-value parame- 
ter allows us to normalize for the risk associated with inventory 
accumulation, when replicating specific supply and demand con- 
figurations that have been shifted by an arbitrary constant in order to 
disguise a design previously used within a given subject population. If 
at the end of any period a trader's working capital falls to zero he or she 
is automatically eliminated from the market and receives zero profit. 
Traders are informed of the final market period at the end of period X 
where X = (final period - unit life). At the end of the experiment all 
remaining inventory units are reimbursed at scrap value regardless of 
the period in which they were purchased. 
When a trader buys a commodity unit the price and the period of 
purchase are logged in the trader's inventory table, as shown in figure 
1. Inventory accumulation is governed by a financial inventory con- 
straint and a physical inventory constraint. The financial constraint 
states that traders can continue accumulating inventory units as long as 
their working capital exceeds their total inventory cost net of scrap 
value (displayed on the trader's screen at all times). In other words, for 
the trader to continue buying, the working capital must cover the loss 
that would be incurred if all currently held inventory units were to 
3. A set of screen prints displaying the instructions that PLATO presents to traders in 
preparation for the experiment is available from the authors. 
4. Short sales are currently prohibited. If a trader attempts to enter an offer to sell a 
unit when his or her current inventory is zero, the following message appears on the 
viewing screen: "iNo units available for sale. Press -DATA- to become a buyer." 
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expire and be sold for their scrap value. We thus limit the amount of 
credit available to the traders. A physical inventory constraint exists 
because a maximum of seven units will fit in the inventory table given 
the horizontal space limitations of the display screen. 
Traders' inventories are automatically maintained on a first in-first 
out basis. When an inventory unit is sold the unit is removed from the 
inventory table and the sale price, purchase price, and resulting profit 
are recorded in the trader's record sheet under the period in which the 
sale was made. Traders are limited to a maximum of five sales in any 
single period, again because the screen display area is limited. 
III. Experimental Subjects 
All of the experiments reported in the following sections use subjects 
drawn from the undergraduate and graduate student populations at the 
University of Arizona in Tucson and Indiana University in Blooming- 
ton. Most subjects were drawn from undergraduate economic theory 
classes. Many of the experiments were run "multisite" with subjects 
participating simultaneously at both locations. Except where explicitly 
noted, all subjects were experienced in the sense that they had partici- 
pated in at least one previous double-auction experiment (with com- 
pletely different market parameters) and had shown no significant 
problem grasping the institutional rules or trading mechanics of the 
computerized marketplace.5 Experienced subjects are usually re- 
cruited by telephone, since they indicated a desire to participate again 
in such experiments by leaving their phone number with the experi- 
menter at the conclusion of the first experiment. Our revolunteer rate is 
nearly 100%. 
After arriving at the experiment site, participants are each paid $3 for 
keeping their appointment and are then randomly assigned to individ- 
ual PLATO computer terminals. The double-auction program then (1) 
assigns each terminal to the condition of buyer, seller, or trader, (2) 
presents the instructions at an individually controlled pace, and (3) 
executes the experiment and stores the resulting data on disk for later 
recall and analysis. The role of buyer and seller were assigned ran- 
domly by PLATO. In the speculation experiments, however, the assign- 
ment of the trader's role was not random. Because of the complexity of 
the task confronted by traders, we chose for this role persons who 
were either very experienced with the basic mechanism or were other- 
wise considered unlikely to have difficulty understanding the mechan- 
ics of being a trader. 
5. See Williams (1980), Ketcham et al. (1983), and Smith and Williams (1983b) for 
discussions of subject experience as an explicit experimental treatment variable in PLATO 
market experiments. 
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IV. Four Markets with Cycling Demand and Stationary Supply 
Experimental Design I 
So that our initial results may readily be compared with the previous 
experimental work, our first experiments employ the same induced 
supply and demand configurations as the studies by MPS (1977, experi- 
ment 2) and Williams (1979). These supply and demand arrays are 
displayed on the left portion of figure 2. The 12 units in each array are 
distributed among four buyers and four sellers such that each has three 
units potentially traded.6 Demand cycles between Do in the odd- 
numbered periods and D? in the even-numbered periods while supply 
remains stationary. This results in theoretical price-quantity autarkic 
equilibria of (P, = $3.40, Q0 = 5) in the odd-numbered periods and (Po 
= $4.20, Q0 = 9) in even-numbered periods. The intertemporal com- 
petitive equilibrium price, P*, is $3.80 with seven units exchanged in 
the odd-numbered periods (Q* = 7), 11 units exchanged in even- 
numbered periods (Q* = 11), and four units carried over from each 
odd- to the next even-numbered period. In each 300-second trading 
period buyers (sellers) earn the difference between their induced mar- 
ginal valuation (sale price) and purchase price (marginal cost) for each 
unit purchased (sold) plus a 5-cent commission to cover subjective 
transaction costs and minimally to induce the trading of marginal units. 
In experiments I t- I and I t-2 reported below, two traders participated 
in the market in addition to the four buyers and sellers. The traders 
were given a $5 capital endowment to cover their initial purchases. The 
commodity perishability parameter (unit life) was set to allow com- 
modity units to be carried over a maximum of two trading periods 
beyond the period purchased. The scrap value was set at $1.7 Experi- 
ments la-i and la-2 are autarkic markets replicating experiments It-I 
and It-2, but with no traders. 
Experimental Results 
The upper part of figure 2 displays sequential contract prices and de- 
scriptive statistics for experiment It-i. The rapidity with which prices 
converge to a range very close to P* is striking. The seasonal price 
fluctuations predicted under autarky are almost nonexistent from the 
very beginning of the experiment. There are 132 contracts over the 
seven market cycles in periods 1-14, compared with 126 contracts 
predicted by the intertemporal competitive model. Traders are in- 
volved in 53% (70) of the contracts, somewhat more than the 44.4% 
6. The earlier studies cited used six buyers and six sellers, each having two units 
potentially traded. 
7. The MPS and Williams studies used a $3 capital endowment and had no scrap-value 
parameter. Our design I supply and demand arrays have been shifted up by a constant of 
$1 (our scrap value) relative to those used in these earlier studies. 
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(eight of every 18) predicted at the theoretical intertemporal equilib- 
rium price. 
The lower part of figure 2 displays the level of traders' inventories 
after each contract occurs. It follows that if a contract is plotted as an 
open circle (a trader was involved in the exchange) there must be a 
corresponding increase or decrease in a trader's inventory. We see that 
the traders were immediately active in the market, being involved in 
five of the first seven contracts. Note that a unit purchased by trader 1 
during the first period was sold the same period. The practice of in- 
traperiod trading became quite common throughout the entire experi- 
ment, since the traders were able to gain the 5-cent commission for 
sales of inventory units regardless of the capital gain.8 There are even 
instances where traders are on both ends of an exchange (e.g., the sixth 
contract in period 8.) The "doomsday" effect built into the market by 
having all inventory units expire after the final trading period is evident 
in the period 15 price series. When the traders reduce their usual odd- 
period purchasing, prices immediately drop toward the autarkic equi- 
librium. 
Figure 3 displays sequential contract prices, traders' inventory 
levels, and descriptive statistics for experiment It-2. The price vari- 
ance is much greater and convergence toward P* much slower than in 
experiment It-i. With the exception of periods 2 and 4, prices tend to 
lag away from P* in the direction of the autarkic equilibrium. By the 
seventh complete market cycle (periods 13 and 14) prices appear to 
have stabilized near P*. As in experiment It-i, the built-in doomsday 
effect is evident in period 15 where prices clearly diverge from P* 
toward P. Over periods 1-14 traders are involved in 43% (52) of the 
121 total contracts. Both total exchange volume and the percentage of 
contracts involving traders are less than the theoretical prediction as 
well as what was observed in experiment It-i. 
Figures 4 and 5 display sequential contract prices and descriptive 
statistics for experiment la-i and experiment la-2 (design I, autarky), 
respectively. Prices in both markets display a clear tendency to lag 
behind the cyclical demand shifts, converging toward P0 from above in 
the odd periods and toward P0 from below in the even periods. This 
"hysteresis" effect was also present in the autarky experiment con- 
ducted by Williams (1979) and in two experiments with growing de- 
mand reported by Smith (1980) and to some extent in experiments with 
8. Elsewhere (Smith and Williams 1983a), we report experimental results in which 
participants can be interpreted as revealing the subjective cost associated with double- 
auction trading. This measure indicates that such costs average between 5 and 10 cents 
per trade. However, many trades occur that yield a gain of less than 5 cents, indicating 
that for some individuals a 5-cent commission is more than sufficient compensation for 
transactions costs. 
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TABLE 1 Contract Price Comparison: Speculation Experiments lt-1, lt-2 versus 
Autarky Experiments la-1, la-2 
Mean (P - P*) SD 
Trading 
Period It-1,2 la-1,2 It-1,2 la-1,2 Zu 
1 - .204 - .374 .136 .106 2.74*** 
2 -.019 -.062 .151 .268 1.48* 
3 -.128 -.234 .125 .130 1.81** 
4 -.008 .109 .085 .240 1.30* 
5 - .052 - .183 .089 .097 2.99*** 
6 .070 .218 .138 .153 3.36*** 
7 - .020 - .149 .083 .076 2.76*** 
8 .027 .167 .058 .211 2.45*** 
9 .022 - .193 .105 .124 3.67*** 
10 .033 .174 .066 .181 2.40*** 
11 - .099 - .194 .141 .121 1.91** 
12 .031 .162 .054 .141 3.23*** 
13 - .027 - .186 .044 .100 3.63*** 
14 .030 .188 .021 .174 3.44*** 
15 -.132 - .182 .168 .099 1.50* 
All odd -.080 -.210 .132 .120 6.92*** 
All even .024 .137 .095 .213 5.27*** 
*Reject H,, P .10 (direction predicted). 
* Reject H,, P = .05 (direction predicted). 
Reject H, P = .01 (direction predicted). 
growing and then declining demand reported by Harrison, Smith, and 
Williams (1983). 
Note that the first contract in periods 2-15 of experiment la- I occurs 
in the 10-cent interval centered on $3.75. From this starting point 
slightly below P* prices tend to move toward the relevant autarkic 
equilibrium. The first price in each period is less stable in experiment 
la-2 but the general tendency for the price series to be negatively 
(positively) sloped during odd (even) periods is evident. In both experi- 
ments, monotonicity of price changes is somewhat more evident in odd 
periods than in even periods. The sustained lagging of price series 
throughout both autarky experiments suggest that a behavioral equilib- 
rium may be characterized by a nonzero variance price pattern rather 
than the fixed price equilibrium of traditional competitive price theory. 
Table 1 displays a period-by-period comparison of price observa- 
tions pooled across the two experimental replications in each of the 
two treatment groups. The Zu statistic presented is the unit normal 
deviate of the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U statistic. The test sta- 
tistic indicates that we must reject central tendency equality (at the .05 
level, direction predicted) in 12 of the 15 trading periods. In the other 
three periods the null hypothesis is rejected at the .1 level, direction 
predicted. Pooling experimental observations across all odd periods or 
all even periods results in strong rejection of the null hypothesis at the 
.01 level. 
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TABLE 2 Efficiency Comparison: Speculation Experiments lt-1, lt-2 versus 
Autarky Experiments la-i, la-2 
E'9 E* 
Trading 
Period la-I Ia-2 lt-l it-2 la-I la-2 lt-i lt-2 
I 100.00 100.00 113.25 108.00 83.33 83.33 94.38 90.00 
2 98.61 100.00 107.43 106.81 93.42 94.74 101.78 101.19 
3 95.00 100.00 108.50 97.75 79.17 83.33 90.42 81.46 
4 98.61 100.00 104.58 108.26 93.42 94.74 99.08 102.56 
5 95.00 90.00 96.25 117.75 79.17 75.00 80.21 95.63 
6 98.61 97.22 106.60 102.85 93.42 92.10 100.99 97.44 
7 75.00 100.00 117.50 122.50 62.50 83.33 97.92 102.08 
8 94.44 100.00 106.25 95.14 89.47 94.74 100.66 90.13 
9 75.00 95.00 118.25 127.50 62.50 79.17 98.54 106.25 
10 100.00 100.00 104.65 101.74 94.74 94.74 99.14 96.39 
11 95.00 100.00 119.50 62.50 79.17 83.33 99.58 52.08 
12 100.00 100.00 105.69 107.99 94.74 94.74 100.13 102.31 
13 95.00 100.00 121.00 115.00 79.17 83.33 100.83 95.83 
14 98.61 100.00 105.42 106.94 93.42 94.74 99.87 101.31 
15 75.00 80.00 49.50 95.00 62.50 66.67 41.25 79.17 
1-15 92.93 97.48 105.62 104.85 82.67 86.53 93.65 92.92 
In spite of the informational and procedural differences introduced 
by the computerized trading environment, these results strongly sup- 
port the basic conclusion that the existence of speculative agents tends 
to reduce price fluctuations in a market governed by cyclical demand 
and stationary supply. This result holds for a comparison either with 
autarky-theoretic prices or with actual observed autarky prices even in 
the presence of a very pronounced hysteresis effect. 
A second and perhaps more important criterion for the comparison 
of market performance in the two treatment groups is allocative 
efficiency. Table 2 presents two efficiency measures (E') and E*) for 
each period of the four design I experiments. The first measure, E', is 
defined as the actual profit (exclusive of commissions) earned by all 
market participants expressed as a percentage of the maximum poten- 
tial profit available under intertemporal autarky; E* expresses actual 
profit (exclusive of commissions) as a percentage of the total profit 
earned at the intertemporal competitive equilibrium. 
Under autarky the total surplus available to the participants (exclud- 
ing commissions) is $4.00 in odd periods and $14.40 in even periods and 
is split equally between buyers and sellers. At an intertemporal com- 
petitive equilibrium the total surplus available is $4.80 in the odd pe- 
riods ($.60 to buyers, $4.20 to sellers) and $15.20 in even periods 
($1 1.00 to buyers, $4.20 to sellers). Thus, the maximum value of E* 
possible under autarky is 83.33 in odd periods and 94.74 in even pe- 
riods or 92 over one market cycle. At an intertemporal equilibrium the 
value of E' would be 120 in odd periods and 105.56 in even periods or 
108.96 over a market cycle. 
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Table 2 clearly reveals that the efficiency of the speculative markets 
tends to exceed that observed in the autarkic markets. Twenty-four out 
of 30 observations on speculative market efficiency exceed the max- 
imum possible value under autarky. In a period-by-period comparison 
of mean efficiency the speculative mean exceeds the autarkic mean in 
all except period 11. A matched pairs t-test on the period 1-14 means 
yields t(13) = 3.53. Using raw unpaired data yields t(54) = 4.34 and Zu = 
5.05. The introduction of intertemporal speculators results in a highly 
significant increase in allocative efficiency. 
V. Fourteen Markets with Cycling Demand and Supply 
Having demonstrated an ability to replicate the basic results of the 
previous double-auction speculation and autarky experiments using 
our subject pool and computerized trading mechanism, we now turn to 
an investigation of the behavioral characteristics of speculative and 
autarkic markets governed by an entirely new cyclical market design. 
Experimental Design 11 
Figure 6 displays the market supply and demand configurations in- 
duced on four buyers and four sellers in design II. This design is char- 
acterized by a stable cycling of both the supply and demand arrays 
where (D', SO) = (Do + 1.80, SO + 1.80). Note that the autarkic and 
intertemporal equilibrium prices are not unique but are defined over a 
10-cent interval centered on PF, PF, and P*, where P* = (PO + .80) = 
(P" - .80). The autarkic and intertemporal competitive quantities are 
Q= Q, = 7 and Q* = 11 with nine units carried over from each odd 
to the next even period by traders. The autarkic price spread is thus 
double that of design I and the optimal carry-over is one unit more than 
double that in design I. In all of the design II experiments traders were 
given a capital endowment of $10. The unit life was set for three pe- 
riods and the scrap value was set at (P* - 1.80). Each trading period 
lasted 330 seconds and, unlike the design I experiments, no commis- 
sion was paid on traded units. 
Table 3 displays additional information for each of the fourteen de- 
sign II experiments.9 The first four experiments, 2a-1, 2a-2, 2a-3, and 
2a-4 are autarkic markets. The other 10 markets included speculators; 
two in experiment 2t-1 and three in the other nine experiments. All but 
one of the experiments used participants who were experienced with 
9. The expression in parenthesis in col. 1 of table 4 is the name we have given the 
particular experiment for disk storage and recall. For example, 2a-1 (3pda 13) means that 
experiment 2a-I in this report was the thirteenth run on version 3 of the PLATO Double 
Auction TUTOR software. The correspondence for the design I experiments is as follows: 
lt-l (3pdaO5), lt-2 (3pda82), la-I (3pdaO7), la-2 (3pda8l). The experiments were con- 
ducted over a span of more than 3'/4 years beginning in June 1979. 
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TABLE 3 Experiment Classification: Design II 
Experienced Summary 
Number of Buyers and Price Final 
Experiment Speculators Sellers? Information? Period p* 
2a-1 (3pdal3) 0 yes no 14 3.80 
2a-2 (3pdal4) 0 yes no 13 3.80 
2a-3 (3pda56) 0 yes no 14 6.60 
2a-4 (3pda57) 0 yes no 14 5.30 
2t-1 (3pdal7) 2 yes no 12 5.80 
2t-2 (3pda22) 3 yes no 14 4.50 
2t-3 (3pda23) 3 no no 14 5.80 
2t-4 (3pda29) 3 yes no 12 4.50 
2t-5 (3pda34) 3 yes no 8* 5.80 
2t-6 (3pda37) 3 yes no 14 6.80 
2tp-1 (3pda42) 3 yes yes 14 6.80 
2tp-2 (3pda43) 3 yes yes 9t 4.50 
2tp-3 (3pda48) 3 yes yes 15 6.80 
2tp-4 (3pdaSO) 3 yes yes 15 4.50 
Terminated after period 8 because of computer problems. 
* Terminated after period 9 because of computer problems. 
PLATO double-auction trading mechanics; the exception was experi- 
ment 2t-3, which employed inexperienced buyers and sellers but expe- 
rienced speculators. In experiments 2tp-1 through 2tp-4 all subjects 
were given access between trading periods to a table containing the 
quantity exchanged and the average, highest, and lowest contract price 
in all previous periods. The reasoning behind the introduction of this 
additional information will become clear in the next section. With the 
exception of experiments 2t-5 and 2tp-2 (which were terminated be- 
cause of computer problems) the final period of trading was governed 
by a 2-hour time limit on our exclusive use of the PLATO facilities at our 
respective institutions. 
Experimental Results 
Figures 7a, 7b, and 7c plot the sequence of mean contract prices and 
the quantity exchanged for all 14 of the design II experiments. One 
observation that is immediately clear from figures 7a and 7b is that the 
rapid convergence of speculative market prices to the intertemporal 
competitive equilibrium, so apparent in experiment It, is not generally 
observed using the design II parameters. Experiment 2t-2 is the only 
market that appears to have stabilized at a price near (actually slightly 
below) P*. The other nine speculation experiments exhibit various 
degrees of partial convergence to P*; however, mean prices are clearly 
closer to P* than in the four autarky experiments (fig. 7a). This conclu- 
sion is supported by figure 8, which displays 99% confidence bands for 
the mean contract price in each trading period for both the pooled 
speculation and pooled autarky samples. Note that the bands do not 
This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 19:29:10 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
18 Journal of Business 
Price Price Price Price 
Exp 2a-1 _ Exp 2a-2 Exp 2a-3 _ Exp 2a-4 
(3pdal3) _ (3pdal4) _ (3pda56) (3pda57) 
4.60 ? P 4 60 ? Po 7 40* - - ----r*--PO 6 10 * P 
420 420 700 570 
3 80 -----------P 3 80 ? -? P' 6 60?- ?_------P 5 30 ? p 
3 40 3 40 6 20 4 90 
3 00 - 
-0 3 00 5 80 - Po-*FP 4 50 
t F t t t 
5 10 4 5 10 13 5 o 10 4 5 10 14 
Quantity Quantity Quantity Quantity 
Q 1 -----------  111-- -- 11 ---- ---Q 
7 7.*. -. *- - -0 -.. 7_ __-- * -.Q 7 
_ _..QO 7 
___ .-;;0-** -Qo 
F, I I I I I """'. t t L t F,...1 1t t 
5 10 14 5 10 13 5 10 14 5 10 14 
FIG. 7a.-Sequential mean contract prices: autarky experiments 
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FIG. 7b.-Sequential mean contract prices: speculation experiments without 
summary information. 
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FIG. 7c.-Sequential mean contract prices: speculation experiments with 
summary information 
intersect after period 2, which marks the end of the first market cycle. 
This is because of a gradual movement of the mean price in the specu- 
lative markets away from the autarkic equilibrium toward P* as traders 
become active in the market. 
The autarkic market price data presented in figures 7a and 8 is fur- 
ther summarized by the pooled contract price frequency polygons pre- 
sented in figure 9. Note that these sample distributions are derived 
from market cycles 3 through 7 and thus exclude contracts that oc- 
curred during the initial periods of trading. The distribution of odd- 
P-P* 
1 00- 
P0 80 -? __ -_ - _ -_ _- I l I 1- * , * Autarkic Markets 
60 I (even periods) 
40 - 
- I j Speculative Markets 
20 (even periods) 
P* 0 ------------------ ---- 
-20 Speculative Markets 
-40 | j | (odd periods) 
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P -80 | ( odd periods) 
-100 o 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Trading Period 
FIG. 8.-Confidence bands (99%) for mean contract price 
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FIG. 9.-Contract price frequency polygons: autarky experiments 
period contract prices can be characterized as symmetric with mean, 
median, and mode at the midpoint of the range of autarkic competitive 
equilibrium prices. In sharp contrast with this, the distribution of even- 
period prices can be characterized as asymmetric (downward skewed) 
with a mean 2.1 cents below the minimum of the range of competitive 
equilibrium prices and a median and mode at the minimum competitive 
equilibrium price. A comparison of the two sample distributions, ex- 
pressed as deviations from the appropriate autarkic equilibrium price, 
yields Zu = 6.473 (reject the null hypothesis, p < .01). The data clearly 
indicate that the hysteresis effect, noted in experiment la, is present in 
the even-period data but not in the odd-period data. We find this rather 
surprising and offer no formal behavioral-theoretic explanation for this 
empirical result.10 We can, however, point out that this phenomenon 
can be interpreted as consistent with recent experimental evidence 
offered by us (Smith and Williams 1982) in support of what we might 
call a "weak-sellers" hypothesis. This simply states that, over a large 
number of experimental replications, there appears to be a tendency 
for contract prices to converge to a static, symmetric-rent, competitive 
equilibrium from below and that this effect can combine with certain 
design parameters (e.g., the distribution of exchange surplus) to deter- 
mine the observed price convergence path. One explanation of the 
dissimilarities displayed by the figure 9 frequency polygons is that the 
weak-seller effect tends to offset the lagging of prices above P( pre- 
dicted by the hysteresis effect during odd periods. But the weak-seller 
10. A comparison of pooled price data from market cycles 5-7 of the two design I 
autarky experiments shows that there is no significant difference in the mean absolute 
price deviation from P* across market phases (Zu = .41). Significantly higher price 
variance is, however, observed in even periods (F78.44 = 2.8) relative to odd periods. 
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FIG. 10.-Experiment 2a-1 (design II, autarky) 
and hysteresis effects combine during even periods to produce the 
distinct lagging of prices below P". An alternative explanation is that 
the first phase of the market cycle is somehow weighted more heavily 
than the second in the price expectation formation process. This could 
easily be tested by conducting a set of experiments with the cyclical 
phases reversed. 
Figures 10, 11, 12, and 13 display the actual sequence of contract 
prices and descriptive statistics for autarky experiments 2a-1, 2a-2, 2a- 
3, and 2a-4, respectively. Note that the markets are extremely efficient 
regardless of the cyclical phase. Prices in 2a-1 exhibit a hysteresis 
effect in both the odd-period and even-period phases. However, price 
convergence in 2a-2 and 2a-3 is generally from below in both cyclical 
phases. Market prices in 2a-4 converge very rapidly to the upper 
(lower) bound of the odd (even) period range of competitive equilib- 
rium prices. 
From figure 7b we note that experiments 2t-1 through 2t-6 display 
varying degrees of partial convergence to P*. After we conducted these 
first six speculation experiments it seemed apparent that traders were 
quite frequently not fully aware of the market's cyclical nature or the 
opportunities for profit available to them through interperiod carry- 
over of inventories. In an attempt to help focus the subjects' attention 
on the low-high (odd-even) price cycle we decided to provide them 
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FIG. 13.-Experiment 2a-4 (design II, autarky) 
where 
Q 
(2(t [pi(t) _ p*]2; 
Pi(t) the ith contract price in trading period t; 
Q the total quantity exchanged during period t; 
P*--intertemporal competitive equilibrium price; and 
I = 1 if summary price information was provided, 0 otherwise. 
Thus, the price series in a particular period of trading is "close" to P* 
only if the price variance is low and the mean price is near P*. Least- 
squares estimation of the equation specified above yields: 
lna - .161 - .118t - .090I + .044(t x I) 
(p 0) (p = .652) (p = .0921) 
R2 = .348, F(3115) = 20.5. 
The rather surprising result is that the presentation of summary price 
information tends to retard slightly, rather than to speed up, the rate of 
price convergence to P*. Both sets of experiments start the conver- 
gence process from an ot value very close to .75 (note that the minimum 
autarkic equilibrium price spread is - .75 to + .75 in fig. 4). Choosing a 
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FIG. 14.-Contract price frequency polygons: speculation experiments 
target value of (x = .05 (the range of intertemporal equilibrium prices is 
from - .05 to + .05) we find that (x would decay to the target value after 
25 periods of trading under the "no summary information" treatment 
and after 38 periods of trading when summary information is provided. 
The substantial variation in prices generated during the final market 
cycles of the speculation experiments is illustrated by the separate odd- 
and even-period frequency polygons and descriptive summary statis- 
tics for pooled period 9-14 data, shown in figure 14. 
Figures 15-18 plot the sequence of contract prices, each trader's 
inventory level, and descriptive statistics for speculation experiments 
2t-1, 2t-2, 2t-3, and 2tp-3, respectively. In experiment 2t-1 we observe 
a partial elimination of the autarkic price spread with prices being fairly 
stable during the sixth market cycle (periods 11 and 12) at (P0 + .27) 
and (P0 - .41). It is tempting to conjecture that the traders were 
sophisticated enough to realize that it was in their combined best inter- 
est to maintain such a price spread.'2 However, the reason for its 
existence is clear after examining the sequence of traders' inventory 
levels presented in the lower part of figure 15. We note that trader 1 
was responsible for most of the successful speculative activity in this 
market and that trader 2 was, after repeated losses, almost completely 
inactive over the last two market cycles. The net aggregate change in 
traders' inventories, starting with period 1, is +2, +2, + 1, -1, +4, 
- 6, + 5, - 6, + 4, - 5, + 5, - 5. This is insufficient to eliminate the 
cyclical price swings. 
Trader 1 is very conservative over the first two market cycles, buy- 
ing and then selling one unit in both periods 1 and 2. He then carries 
one unit over from period 3 to period 4, earns a sizable profit ($1.60) on 
this unit, and then falls into a pattern of buying in the odd periods and 
12. The price spread that would maximize traders' joint profits is (P(, + .35) - (P" - 
.35) with a total of six units carried over from each odd- to each even-numbered period. 
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selling in the even periods for the remainder of the market. In contrast 
to this behavior, trader 2 quickly enters the market and carries two 
units over from period 1 to period 2; she then buys two additional units 
in period 2 and sells the two units purchased during period 1 for profits 
of $1.61 and $1.10, respectively. She then buys two more units in the 
high-price period for a total of four period 2 units carried over into 
period 3. One of these units is sold in the next period for a $2.20 loss, 
two are sold in period 4 for losses of $.39 and $.15, and the final unit is 
sold at a loss of $2.40 in period 5 (after which it would have been sold at 
its $4.00 scrap value for a loss of $3.50). For the remainder of the 
experiment trader 2 does not seem to recognize the proper buy-sell 
sequence, much to the advantage of trader 1, who amasses a working 
capital of $30.63 over the course of the experiment. By contrast, trader 
2's working capital falls from $10.00 to $6.92. 
After running experiment 2t- 1 we decided to use three traders in the 
subsequent speculation experiments. The socially optimal intertem- 
poral carry-over would thus be obtained if each trader bought and sold 
three units in each odd-even market cycle. Figure 16 displays price and 
inventory data from experiment 2t-2. Prices approach P* fairly rapidly, 
reflecting net inventory changes of + 3, - 2, + 6, -6, + 8, - 7, + 10, 
- 8, + 8, - 9, + 8, - 10, + 8, - 9 for periods 1- 14, respectively. Trad- 
ers 1 and 3 are quite consistent in following a profitable buy-sell se- 
quence but accumulate a working capital of only $12.19 and $11.99, 
respectively, for their efforts because the autarkic price spread is elimi- 
nated. Trader 2 does not follow the odd-even buy-sell pattern until 
period 11 and ends with a working capital of $9.64. 
Figure 17 displays the price and inventory data from experiment 2t-3 
which exhibits partial convergence to P* even though three traders 
were operating in the market. Net inventory changes for periods 1-14 
are +4, -3, +6, -6, +8, -5, +7, -5, +7, -8, +6, -8, +7, -9. 
In this market trader 2 is almost totally inactive throughout the entire 
experiment but does manage to lose $2 of his $10 starting capital. In 
contrast to this, trader 1 is a very successful speculator earning $21.71 
by the end of period 14. Trader 1 failed to unload all of his inventory 
units during the final period of trading and consequently is forced to 
absorb a $2.75 loss for selling a unit at scrap value. Trader 1 com- 
mented after the experiment that he had mistakenly purchased a unit at 
the beginning of period 14 when he meant to sell. This raised his inven- 
tory level to six units and since the maximum number of sales in any 
one period is limited to five, he was forced ultimately to pay for his 
error. Trader 3 is also quite successful in his speculative activities, 
earning $24.60 during the experiment. 
Figure 18 plots price and inventory data from experiment 2tp-3 
where all subjects were provided summary price information between 
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TABLE 4 Autarky-Speculation Efficiency Comparison: Design II 
E? E* 
Trading 
Period Autarky Speculation Autarky Speculation 
1 94.15 103.15 55.86 61.20 
2 94.35 148.90 55.98 88.34 
3 97.78 113.61 58.01 67.40 
4 98.59 154.24 58.49 91.51 
5 98.79 97.14 58.61 57.63 
6 98.79 177.29 58.61 105.19 
7 98.59 108.18 58.49 64.18 
8 98.18 189.02 58.25 112.15 
9 98.79 122.73 58.61 72.82 
10 94.96 187.28 56.34 111.11 
11 99.60 128.63 59.09 76.32 
12 99.60 179.37 59.09 106.42 
13 98.99 128.39 58.73 76.17 
14 99.19 164.05 58.85 97.33 
1-14 97.88 142.99 58.07 89.84 
periods. Net aggregate inventory changes for periods 1-15 are +3, 
-3, +6, -5, +4, -5, +7, -6, +6, -2, +7, -6, +7, -8, -3. 
Traders 1-3 ended with working capital of $17.66, $14.24, and $19.06, 
respectively. Note that trader 3 has two inventory units remaining 
when time expires in the final trading period and must cover a $2.93 
loss on these units. A clear end effect is present in period 15 as traders 
1 and 3 try to unload five inventory units in an odd period, causing 
prices to drop sharply back to and below the autarkic equilibrium. 
Table 4 presents a pooled autarkic-speculative market efficiency 
comparison. The speculative markets generate a higher mean 
efficiency in all trading periods except period 5 (when they are almost 
identical). A matched pairs t-test using the mean value of E? given in 
table 4 yields t(13) = 5.183. The design II parameters are such that at the 
autarkic competitive equilibria buyers and sellers split $6.20 in surplus 
equally each period. At the intertemporal competitive equilibrium, to- 
tal surplus available is $10.45, with buyers (sellers) receiving $.35 and 
sellers (buyers) receiving $10.10 during each odd (even) trading period. 
Thus, an E value of 100 implies a corresponding E* value of 59.33 and 
an E* value of 100 implies an E? value of 168.55. Except for period 5, 
the mean efficiency in the speculative markets exceeds the maximum 
possible efficiency in an autarkic market (E = 100, E* = 59.33). Also, 
it is instructive to note the low-high (odd-even) efficiency cycle in the 
speculation experiments. This is due to the fact that purchases by 
traders were generally made in odd (low price) periods and resulted in 
an immediate profit only for the seller. Traders generally made profits 
on the sale of inventory units in even (high-price) periods. 
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VI. Summary 
Using observations from two cyclical market designs, we have shown 
that the inclusion of a class of speculative agents tends to reduce 
significantly the observed magnitude of cyclical price swings relative 
to those observed in markets without intertemporal speculation. In- 
cluding speculators also results in a significant increase in market 
efficiency. 
In a market with shifting demand and stable supply (design I) we 
observe convergence toward the zero excess demand intertemporal 
equilibrium price when speculative agents are active in the market. 
Without speculators, prices display a marked lagging in the adjustment 
from one cyclical phase to the other. When a considerably different 
market design with shifting supply and demand is used (design II), 
prices do not generally converge to the intertemporal competitive equi- 
librium within the seven-cycle duration of most experiments. This slow 
rate of price convergence is attributed to risk-averse behavior by 
speculators, resulting in intertemporal carry-over below the socially 
optimal level. Without speculators, prices tend to cycle between the 
two (autarkic) equilibria. An investigation of the price series and result- 
ing frequency distributions generated in odd (low-price) and even 
(high-price) periods shows a tendency for prices to lag somewhat be- 
low the competitive equilibrium during even periods but not during odd 
periods. An informal explanation is offered to account for this empir- 
ical phenomenon. 
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